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ABSTRACT 
 
DANA FALKENBERG:  Finite Lives and Infinite Ends:  An Account of our (Imperfect) 
Obligations to Future Generations 
(Under the direction of Thomas E. Hill, Jr.) 
 
 
 Rights-based accounts of obligations to future generations suffer from a number 
of theoretical difficulties, most notably the non-identity problem.  A more fruitful way of 
understanding these obligations (if, indeed, there are any) is through the notion of 
imperfect obligations.  Imperfect obligations are actions that are owed to others even 
when those others lack a corresponding right to demand those actions of us.  One way of 
establishing that we do indeed have obligations of this nature to future generations can be 
illustrated by the incoherence of willing a principle of indifference toward future 
generations.  Because we are finite rather than self-sufficient beings, we must rely on the 
cooperation of future generations in order to have our current projects succeed.   
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 It is easy to unreflectively take obligations to future generations for granted.  It 
seems that surely we are obligated to make some small sacrifices of our well-being for 
the sake of future people.  It seems obviously wrong for us to allow toxic chemicals to 
leach out of a landfill and poison people’s groundwater, even if this will not occur for 
another hundred and fifty years, and those who will be affected by our action have not yet 
been born.  Yet it can be difficult to account for the wrongness of such actions.  We 
usually want to say that such actions are wrong because of the harm that is done to people.  
But, we must then be able to offer an account of who is harmed and how she is made 
worse off. 
 One strategy is to assert that such actions violate the rights of future generations, 
rights that give current generations a corresponding obligation to respect those rights.  If 
we truly owe it to future generations to promote their good, then they must have a right to 
our aid, a right that they can claim against us.1  However, rights-based accounts of 
obligations are not well-suited for taking future generations into account.  It seems 
uncontroversial enough to assert that once future generations are born, they will have 
rights that correspond with their interests and that they will be people who must be taken 
into account morally.  What is less clear is whether such future people can be said to have 
rights now, and that we have obligations toward them on account of these rights.  
 Another way of approaching the problem posed by future generations is to deny 
                                               
1For examples of such arguments see Martin Golding’s “Obligations to Future Generations” and Joel 
Feinberg’s “Rights of Animals and Unborn Generations both in Responsibilities to Future Generations: 
Environmental Ethics, Ernest Partride, ed., (Buffalo, NY:  Prometheus Books, 1980).   
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that future generations have rights or interests, and then conclude that we have no 
obligations toward future generations.2  Perhaps we still care about future generations, 
but this is simply a matter of sympathy, an extension of the concern we have for our own 
children and grandchildren and not something that can be demanded of us morally.   
 The general dichotomy that goes on in discussions of our obligations to future 
generations (if, indeed, we have any) – that between justice and rights, and between what 
is nice but is in no way owed -- is unsatisfying.  Surely it would be wrong for us to 
destroy our environment and make the world uninhabitable – even if we cannot pinpoint 
exactly who is wronged in this scenario, who it is who has a right against us, or whose 
interests have been ignored or neglected.  Surely it would be wrong to squander resources 
that may be desperately needed by those who come to exist after we are long gone, even 
if conservation would have caused different people to exist, and so those who do exist are 
not made worse off by our actions.   
 It seems that what is needed is an account of obligations to future generations that 
avoids the pitfalls of rights-based accounts of such obligations and yet is able to insist 
that concern for future generations is morally required, that actions expressive of such a 
concern can be morally demanded of us.  The concept of imperfect obligations seems to 
be a concept well-suited to the case of future generations.  First, I will illustrate exactly 
which difficulties an account of obligations to future generations must face, and reveal 
the shortcomings of accounts that rely on a notion of rights.  Then I will show how 
understanding our obligations to future generations as imperfect obligations seems to 
avoid these difficulties and also yield fruitful results.  Finally, I will argue that the 
                                               
2See, for example, Thomas Schwartz’s “Obligations to Posterity” in Obligations to Future Generations, 
Brian Barry and R.I. Sikora, eds., (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1978).   
 3 
grounds for such obligations can be established on a Kantian framework.  A principle of 
indifference toward future generations cannot consistently be willed on account of ends 
that non self-sufficient (or finite) agents cannot rationally renounce.  A principle of moral 
indifference to future generations will involve a fundamental misunderstanding of the 
sort of finite beings we are, and what is involved when such a limited being wills an end.   
 
 In order to see why imperfect obligations are a convenient concept in the case of 
our obligations to future generations we must first illustrate some of the problems with 
which an account of obligations– particularly rights-based accounts – to future 
generations must grapple.  As Rawls famously put it, “There is no need to stress the 
difficulties that this problem raises.  It subjects any theory to severe if not impossible 
tests”3.  Ethical theories of a modern liberal bent, in which rights and contractual relations 
often play a central role, face the following problems in particular.  First, simply the 
temporal location of future people appears to be worrisome.  Two of the common ways 
for liberal theories to ground a source of community out of which our moral and social 
rights and obligations arise, are explicit contracts and reciprocal relations.  But, the 
temporal location of future generations creates problems for both of these accounts.4   
Obviously, we cannot make explicit contracts with people who may, but currently do not, 
exist.  Furthermore, reciprocity depends on social arrangements in which all members 
recognize the benefits that accrue to them on account of their participation in the system.  
Because of the benefits that they receive from cooperation, they acknowledge that they 
also have an obligation to share in the burdens of the cooperative scheme.  But, it is 
                                               
3A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition (Cambridge, MA:  Harvard University Press, 1999), p. 251.   
 
4These criticisms are succinctly stated by Golding in his “Obligations to Future Generations”.   
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argued that we cannot engage in reciprocal relations with future generations.  The actions 
of future generations are said to be unable to help or harm us, as we will long be dead and 
invulnerable by the time they are active agents.5  The only relation available is radically 
vulnerability on the part of future generations, and the inability to be harmed on behalf of 
the existing generation.  There can be no interests on our part that are served by future 
generations that can be appealed to in order to establish an obligation.  Theories that base 
the source of moral or social obligation in these relations, while simultaneously excluding 
altruistic impulses as a fundamental source of social obligation such as Rawls’, seem to 
necessarily exclude future generations from consideration.  If such obligations have 
grounds, then explicit contracts and relations of reciprocity seem to be misguided. 
 If appeals to advantageous cooperative social arrangements cannot easily ground 
obligations to future generations, perhaps the next place to look would be our more 
altruistic impulses:  sympathy for the vulnerability of future generations, a fellow feeling 
that is a more abstract form of the love that we have for our more immediate posterity – 
our children and grandchildren.  We might then say that our sympathy gives us reason to 
promote the good of future persons and to help them achieve their ends. But future people 
are not capable, now, of setting their own ends.  There are no ends that they have set that 
we can help them to achieve.  Must we then set ends for them?  This causes two separate 
concerns.  First we face a problem of paternalism.  If future generations do have rights, 
then acting for the sake of future generations can risk forcing our conception of the good 
onto them, which would then violate their rights.  Secondly, desiring the good for another 
                                               
 
5For a summary of such arguments, and an account of how future generations can properly be said to help 
or harm us, and not simply our reputations, see John O’Neill’s “Future Generations:  Present Harms” in 
Philosophy, Vol. 68, No. 263 January, 1993, pp. 35-51. 
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person presupposes that we have a particular good in mind for that particular person.  
This is problem is nicely phrased by Martin Golding.  “My desire for another’s good 
must in this event be more than impulsive, and presupposes, rather that I have a 
conception of his good.  This conception, which cannot be a bare concept of what is 
incidentally a good but which is rather a conception of the good for him, further involves 
that he not be a mere blank to me but that he is characterized or described in some way in 
my consciousness.”6   In order to promote the good of future generations, we must be 
able to discern what the goods for the individuals of the future will be.  In addition to the 
moral problem of paternalism, we risk misguided conception of the good of the people in 
(distant) future generations which could result in a lowering of future welfare.  Our 
sacrifices made on behalf of future generations can be wasteful efforts on or part, or even 
harmful to future generations.   
  Thirdly, if we can be said to have obligations toward future generations, to whom 
do we owe these obligations?  Famously, Derek Parfit’s non-identity problem has shown 
that person-affecting principles, principles that account for morality of an action in terms 
of whether people are made better or worse by the action, do not apply in the case of 
future generations.  If what we do determines not only the conditions in which future 
people live, but also which people are born it can be impossible to argue that a policy or 
action has made these people better or worse off.  The alternative for those made worse 
off by the policy is not exist.  “It is in fact true of everyone that, if he had not been 
conceived within a month of the time when he was in fact conceived, he would never 
have existed.  Because this is true, we can easily affect the identities of future people, or 
who the people are who will later live.  If a choice between two social policies will affect 
                                               
6Golding, p. 66.   
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the standard of living or the quality of life for about a century, it will affect the details of 
all the lives that, in our community, are later lived.  As a result, some of those who later 
live will owe their existence to our choice of one of these two policies.  After one or two 
centuries, this will be true of everyone in our community”.7 
 Because of the contingency of the identities of future people, if there is something 
wrong with pursuing a long-term policy, such as overpopulating the world and depleting 
limited by necessary natural resources, or releasing chemicals into the atmosphere that 
will have widespread, deleterious effects on human health, what cannot be wrong with it 
is that it makes worse off the specific individuals that it does.  In order for them not to be 
“harmed” or made worse off by these policies, a different policy would have been carried 
out, which would then have affected exactly which individuals were born – other people 
would then be less miserable.  Person-affecting principles rely on our actions making the 
same people better or worse off, then, cannot be used to account for obligations to future 
generations.   
 Unfortunately, most convincing accounts of rights rely on person-affecting 
principles.8  It is difficult to give an intelligible account of rights without appeal to the 
harms and interests of individual people.   Rights and justice are primarily concerned 
with our treatment of other people, and what one must do in order to avoid harming or 
wronging another.  When we violate another’s rights, we have harmed her, or sacrificed 
her interests in an objectionable manner.  But, if we are dealing with long-reaching 
policies that will affect not only the conditions in which people live, but also which 
                                               
7Parfit, Derek, Reasons and Persons, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1984), p. 377.   
 
8For an account of this, and other problems that rights-based theories of obligations to future generations 
face, see Douglas MacLean’s “A Moral Requirement for Energy Policies” in Energy and the Future, 
MacLean et. al (eds.), (Totowa: Rowman Littlefield, 1983), pp. 184-185. 
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people will be born, just as we cannot say that a future person was made worse off by a 
particular policy, we also cannot meaningfully claim that her rights were violated.  The 
alternative is simply for her not to exist. 
 Nonetheless, there is something compelling in accounts of obligations to future 
generations that make appeal to their rights.  The concept of rights, of inescapable 
obligation, seems appropriate when confronting questions of such importance as the 
continuation of human life.  Appealing to the rights of individuals is often very effective 
in forcing us to expand our moral community, to make it inclusive of those who are 
initially deemed alien or lower when this otherness was not based on a morally relevant 
distinction. 9  By gaining membership in the community “the full force of my obligation 
to him will be manifest to me quite independently of any fellow-feeling that might or 
might not be aroused.  The involuntary character of the obligation will be clear to me, as 
it probably never is in the case of individuals who command one’s sympathy”. 10 Rights 
are also a source of empowerment.  Rights may serve to ground the self-esteem and sense 
of self-worth that allows individuals to demand respect, even if not love, from others.  
“The rhetoric of rights disputes established powers and their categories and seeks to 
empower the powerless; it is the rhetoric of those who lack power and do not accept the 
status quo.  Those who claim their rights deny that the powers that may be may define 
who they are, what they may do, or what they are entitled to”11. Those who are excluded 
                                               
9For similar points see Golding’s  “Obligations to Future Generations”.  For a similar argument in regard to 
the rights of children see Onora O’Neill’s “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives” in Ethics, Vol. 98, No. 
3, April, 1988, pp. 445-463..   
 
10Golding,  p. 68. 
 
11O’Neill “Children’s Rights and Children’s Lives, p. 460. 
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can appeal to the concept of rights to empower them and enable them to make claims for 
recognition and respect that is owed to them by an exclusory community. 
 However, talk of claims and rights and empowerment does not easily apply to 
future generations, and may obscure rather than reveal the sorts of moral relationships 
that do exist. It may be the case that rights talk will mobilize the current generation to 
take steps to secure the rights of future generations through institutions, but this is a 
rhetorical and political advantage that is distinct from moral theory.  In theory, the rights 
of future generations are on the whole clunky and inappropriate and serve to obfuscate 
rather than ground the ties that future generations have with our current moral community. 
Rights are instruments used by the downtrodden of society to get recognition from those 
who have the power to grant them the goods of society.  But there is no good parallel 
when it comes to future generations.  Instead, we are the ones with the power.  We must 
ask ourselves if there is anything that is owed rather than insist that it is owed.  From a 
practical and a theoretical standpoint, then it seems we have grounds to look for a non 
rights-based account of obligations.   
    
 It appears that imperfect duties are one way of establishing obligations to future 
generations that steers clear of the major problems that accounts of obligations to futures 
may face.  If there is an identifiable class of obligations that do not necessarily rely on the 
rights that individuals can claim, then it seems an obvious contender for the sort of 
obligation one might have to people who don’t currently exist.  They are simply things 
we ought to do, rather than actions that are owed to identifiable others at an identifiable 
point in time.  We don’t need to make sense of how there can be valid claims that cannot 
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be claimed because their claimants do not exist.  We do not owe it to a specific individual 
to make her life better than it would otherwise be, but we do have a general obligation to 
care about, and take actions to promote, the well-being of others.    
 Mill and Kant are two historical figures who made use of the theoretical space for 
imperfect obligations and duties.12  Kant’s account of our imperfect obligations and 
duties will be my primary concern.  However, it is useful to frame Kant’s somewhat 
fragmented discussion of imperfect duties – and how they relate to perfect, juridical, 
ethical, wide, and narrow duties – in light of Mill’s straightforward and succinct account.  
Mill is abundantly clear that such duties do not correspond to rights.  But while there is 
no right at issue, such actions are not merely meritorious gifts to be bestowed on the 
downtrodden.  To neglect such considerations or principles would be a moral wrong.  
Obligations, according to Mill are what people are bound to do.   “It is part of the notion 
of duty in every one of its forms that a person may rightfully be compelled to fulfill it.  
Duty is a thing which may be exacted from a person, as one exacts a debt. …. There are 
other things, on the contrary, which we wish that people should do, which we like or 
admire them for doing, perhaps dislike or despise them for not doing, but yet admit that 
they are not bound to do; it is not a case of moral obligation.”13 
 But while these are types of actions that we are bound to do, they are not all 
actions that are clearly owed to other specific individuals.  Because of this, such duties 
are outside the sphere of justice and rights.  In order to classify an act as unjust, we need 
                                               
12While technically our general obligations are what ground our specific duties, for the sake of simplicity in 
this paper I will refer to them as roughly equivalents.   
 
13Mill, Utilitarianism, p. 49. 
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to be able to point to 1.)  a wrong done, and 2.) an identifiable person who is wronged.14  
There must be something that was owed that was denied, and a specific person to whom 
it was denied.  Our obligations that do not depend on what is owed by one person to 
another are instead obligations of beneficence.  “Now it is known that ethical writers 
divide moral duties into two classes, denoted by the ill-chosen expressions, duties of 
perfect and of imperfect obligation; the latter being those in which, though the act is 
obligatory, the particular occasions of performing it are left to our choice, as in the case 
of charity or beneficence, which we are indeed bound to practice but not toward any 
definite person, nor at any prescribed time.  In the more precise language of philosophic 
jurists, duties of perfect obligation are those duties in virtue of which a correlative right 
resides in some person or persons; duties of imperfect obligation are those moral 
obligations which do not give birth to any right.  I think it will be found that this 
distinction exactly coincides with that which exists between justice and other obligations 
of morality.”15 
 Unlike Mill where juridical and ethical duties clearly are distinguished by the 
matter of rights, and clearly align with our perfect and imperfect duties, the distinction 
between obligations that depend on the rights of another, and other forms of obligation 
that do not depend on rights is less precise in Kant.16  Duties of right are largely external 
duties.  External duties are those that are concerned with our actions rather than the 
                                               
 
14Mill, p. 50. 
 
15Mill, p. 49-50. 
 
16This discussion owes much to Marcia Baron’s “Kantian Ethics and the Supererogatory” in Kantian Ethics 
Almost without Apology, and Thomas Hill’s  “Kant on Imperfect Duty and Supererogation” in Dignity and 
Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory.  There are a large range of interpretive issues on these matters.  
For the sake of simplicity, I will restrict the exegetical discussion.   
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grounds from which we act, or the ends that we are required by morality to embrace.  
External duties are those that we can be compelled by others to fulfill.  Actions can be 
compelled of us, but no external force can ever compel us to accept an end – such a 
constraint can only come from within.  Duties of right and our external duties are largely 
concerned with our treatment of others, specifically with our duty not to harm others, to 
infringe on their rights.17  Because duties of rights are largely a matter of our relations 
with others, specifically our external relations or actions, juridical duties can be rightfully 
compelled of us; they involve a corresponding right of another to use compulsion.  They 
are aligned with our perfect duties, our duties that admit of no exceptions.   
 Duties of virtue, or ethical duties, are concerned with our ends rather than our 
external actions and are related to our imperfect duties.18  Our imperfect duties command 
us to embrace certain objectively necessary ends (the ends that are also our duties:  one’s 
own moral perfection and the happiness of others) and are less directly concerned with 
our external treatment of others.  “No external lawgiving can bring about someone’s 
setting an end for himself (because this is an internal act of the mind), although it may 
prescribe external actions that lead to an end without the subject making it his end”19.   
That our ethical duties are less a matter of treatment of others, and more closely aligned 
with improving ourselves and the world in which we live, is a bit easier to notice when 
we consider that the two ends that are also duties quite obviously correspond with Kant’s 
conception of the Highest Good – perfect morality conjoined with perfect happiness.  In 
                                               
 
17For the basic distinction between duties of right and duties of virtue see The Metaphysics of Morals 
6:238-240. 
 
18See The Metaphysics of Morals 6:380, 6:390, and 6:381. 
 
19The Metaphysics of Morals 6:239.   
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an important sense, these are duties to make our selves and the world a certain way, 
rather than duties that mandate or prohibit certain kinds of actions or treatment of one 
another that could be externally enforced.  “[I]n the case of wide imperfect duties, ethics 
gives laws only for maxims, and provides only very indirectly and with great latitude and 
indication as to what actions one is to perform” 20 
 Because such duties to not require that we perform specific actions towards 
specific people, imperfect duties allow a degree of latitude in when, and how to perform 
the sorts of actions that must follow when we embrace certain ends; “the law cannot 
specify precisely in what way one is to act and how much one is to do by the action for an 
end that is also a duty” (MM 6:390).  Imperfect duties can then be narrow or wide, 
meaning that they may be less (narrow) or more (wide) flexible in how or in which ways 
we are required to fulfill them. 21  Both narrow and wide imperfect duties allow us greater 
room than perfect duties to decide whether a given principle is relevant in a particular 
situation, and freedom to choose among different ways of satisfying the principle.  
However, wide imperfect duties also allow us to choose whether or not do perform an 
action in circumstances specified by the principle, as long as we are generally willing to 
perform such actions.  For instance, embracing a principle of beneficence will make me 
willing to help our neighbors.  However, I do not have to help my neighbors every time 
the opportunity presents itself.  It is okay on occasion to sit and enjoy a book on a 
Saturday afternoon, when I could be outside helping them rake their leaves.  This is not 
the case with our narrow imperfect duties – there is never a time when it is morally 
permissible to show a lack of respect for myself, for instance. 
                                               
20Baron, p. 31. 
 
21This closely follows Hill, p. 155 and Baron, p. 30.   
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  The accounts of imperfect duties offered my Mill and Kant reveal how imperfect 
duties may have the potential to avoid some of the major problems that confront rights-
based accounts of our obligations to future generations.  Perhaps most importantly, they 
are flexible in who they are owed to.  The beneficiaries of our acts of charity and 
beneficence, whoever it is who is on the receiving end of our action are largely a matter 
of chance.  If we have a principle of beneficence, we should be willing to help those that 
we happen to encounter simply because they need it and not because it is owed to them as 
a matter of right.  The idea is that we must work to promote the welfare of others, and not 
that we owe it to individuals to make them better off.  In the case of future generations, 
we have a duty to avoid building our toxic-leaking landfill not because we owe it to 
individuals in the future, but because we have a duty to embrace whatever actions will 
promote human happiness or welfare even if these actions may require some effort or 
sacrifice on our part.   Imperfect duties also allow for flexibility in how much is morally 
required while still maintaining that they are morally required.  This may help us make 
sense of how future generations can count without the needs of future generations 
overwhelming the needs of those currently living.  We have a duty to promote human 
welfare, but not to maximize it at the cost of the rights of those currently living. 
 It is also important that for both Mill and Kant, it is not simply meritorious to 
fulfill these duties, but a matter of moral obligation – we are culpable if we fail to fulfill 
these duties.22  While, our imperfect duties may allow for a degree of flexibility in how 
and when we fulfill them, it is never the case that it is morally permissible to 
wholeheartedly neglect developing one’s own talents or promoting the happiness of 
                                               
22See Mill, p. 49, and Kant, The Metaphysics of Morals 6:384.  Thanks to Tom Hill for reminding me to 
emphasize this.   
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others.  In Kant’s terminology, they are ends that we are morally required to embrace and 
actively promote.   It does not simply reveal a lack of merit or virtue in neglecting to 
fulfill these duties, but it is a matter of culpability for which the sanctions of society, or at 
least one’s own conscience, is appropriate.   
 Lastly, particularly in Kant, there is a sense of that these duties have as their focus 
a respect for certain ends, a respect for certain things (one’s own moral improvement and 
the happiness of others) that can be brought about in the world.  These are the sorts of 
moral considerations that seem most applicable in the case of obligations to future 
generations, rather than prescribing specific courses of action in order to avoid violating 
another’s right.  Embracing certain ends prompts us to play a role in bringing our world 
into closer alignment with an ideal world for finite agents such as ourselves, a world 
where perfect virtue meets with perfect happiness 
   
 It seems that if we have duties to future generations, we have good reasons to 
classify them as imperfect duties.  But how are we to establish that they are indeed duties?  
The most obvious way of doing this is to stick closely to Kant’s line of argument.23  
According to the first formulation of the categorical imperative, if obligations to future 
generations are imperfect duties, a principle of indifference to future  generations would 
have to involve a contradiction in the will rather than a contradiction in conception.  In 
order for us to have a contradiction in the will, we must first formulate a maxim --  a 
description of what we will do, in which circumstances in order to achieve our end.  They 
                                               
 
23It is important to note that this is simply one method of establishing obligations to future generations on 
Kantian grounds.  There may be an equally promising way to establish such an obligation through the 
second formulation of the Categorical Imperative, which requires us to treat humanity as an end, never 
merely as a means, but for the sake of simplicity, I will focus on the first formulation.   
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are principles of the form:  I will do x in circumstances y for the sake of z; the point is for 
us to express our conception of what we are doing and why.  The first formulation of the 
categorical imperative is what is used in order to test the permissibility of one’s maxim.  
Contradiction in conception involves a maxim the universalization of which cannot even 
be thought without contradiction.  Famously, the deceitful promiser defeats her own 
purpose.  If everyone were to make a false promise in order to receive a loan, then those 
lending the money will not believe the promise of repayment, and then they would not 
lend the money.  Such a principle cannot be universally willed because it would be self-
defeating.  
  Contradictions of the will are one of the more puzzling and easily misunderstood 
aspects of Kant’s ethics.24  One of the most elucidating accounts, and the most relevant 
for understanding exactly how such arguments can establish obligations to future 
generations, is offered by Barbara Herman in “Mutual Aid and Respect for Persons”.  On 
first glance, Herman argues, contradictions of willing are often taken to be arguments that 
appeal largely to our self-interest in a way that is antithetical to Kant’s theory.  The 
contradiction in will that is involved with the man who is willing to forgo the help of 
others in order to not have to help them, is that such a man may come to need help in the 
future and want to be aided.  But, if this principle had been universalized, he would be his 
own source of his inability to get help; “he would be willing both that the world be such 
                                               
24For background on some of the interpretive issues regarding the first formulation of the Categorical 
Imperative, see Thomas Hill’s  “Kantian Normative Ethics”, David Copp, ed., The Oxford Handbook of 
Ethical Theory (Oxford University Press, 2006), pp. 480-514 and Richard Galvin’s “The Universal Law 
Formulas” in The Blackwell Guide to Kant’s Ethics (Blackwell Publishing, 2009), pp. 52-82.  I focus on 
Herman’s account for the sake of simplicity, but it does not appear to me that my argument rests on 
anything peculiar to her interpretation.  Indeed, it seems that my argument could work even if the first 
formulation of the Categorical Imperative did rely solely on prudential reasoning, as will be obvious below.   
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that no one could help anyone and that he be helped.”25  The problem with this reading is 
that it appears that such a man can give up either his general policy of not helping anyone, 
or give up his end of wanting help.  He could adopt “the attitude toward needed help that 
it is a tolerably unfulfilled desire.”26 
 Herman argues that it is not simply prudential reasoning that dictates that the man 
cannot give up his end of wanting help.  If this were the case the man could just as easily 
calculate the likelihood of his needing help, and decide whether it is reasonable to take a 
chance.  Instead, the problem involved with a principle of non beneficence is that for any 
end, it is not possible for an agent to guarantee in advance that he can pursue his end 
successfully without the help of others.  This is enough to bring about “a contradiction in 
will (supposing one has already willed a law of universal nonbeneficence)  if either of the 
following conditions hold: 1.) that there are ends that the agent wants to realize more than 
he could hope to benefit from nonbeneficence  and that he cannot bring about unaided or 
2.) that there are ends that it is not possible for any rational agent to forgo (ends that are 
in some sense necessary ends).”27 
 Herman views the procedure of the Categorical Imperative as “being designed to 
draw our attention to those features of our condition – as rational agents in this world and 
as members of a community of persons – that serve as the conditions of our willings.”28  
In the case of willing, willing the end entails that we will the necessary means for that 
end (or give up the end, if it is not a necessary end).  The things we can use as means are 
                                               
 
25Herman, pp.  47-48. 
 
26Herman, p. 48. 
 
27Herman, p. 52. 
 
28Ibid. 
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ourselves, things, and other people.  The question is why can’t the strong man give up 
any end that he discovers would require the help of others?  First, the strong man may be 
tempted to abandon the end of living without the help of others, so he must commit 
himself to resisting such temptation.  To be committed to that resistance entails that one 
is committed to the means that are necessary in order to resist.  However, it may be the 
case where circumstances will arise where the only available means to resist the 
temptation will be other people.  “If he rejects the possibility of help here, he will no 
longer be able to guarantee that he will abandon any end that he discovers cannot pursue 
without help.”29  Part of what this contradiction reveals is that, “It is a fact of our nature 
as rational beings that we cannot guarantee that we shall always be capable of realizing 
our ends unaided.”30   Thus, a policy of being indifferent to the needs of others cannot be 
willed because of our status as dependent, finite beings.  It reveals both our duty to help 
others and it defines a community of mutual aid for such finite beings.  Our membership 
in the community is established by our vulnerability, and our rationality – the capacity to 
help others.31  What is problematic in a contradiction of the will is not that the agent does 
what is ultimately not in her interests, but fundamentally misunderstands the sort of being 
that she is.  
 Herman also briefly points out that it may be possible that future generations have 
a claim of mutual aid, despite their being unable to help us – they qualify as the types of 
beings capable of giving aid, even if they cannot in fact give aid.32   But there are much 
                                               
 
29Herman, p. 54.   
 
30Herman, p. 55. 
 
31Herman, P. 60.   
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stronger reasons for including future generations in a community of mutual aid than 
Herman considers, reasons that also draw on what it means for finite agents to will ends.  
Importantly, Herman is mistaken in her assumption that future generations are not 
capable of giving aid to currently living generations.   
  
 Let us take it that that Herman’s line of interpretation regarding mutual aid is 
roughly correct33 and assume that we are members of a community of mutual aid and that 
membership of the community does not extend to future generations.  In other words, let 
us assume that we have obligations to aid those who are members of the current 
generation, but no obligation to aid those of future generations.   We would then have to 
be able to universally will as our principle something along the following form.  “I will 
be a fully functioning member of the current community of mutual aid.  I will do my best 
to help others so long as they are members of the currently living generation.  But, I will 
not take into account future generations, those who do not currently exist.  I will not go 
out of my way to make them worse off, but I will also not take actions to promote their 
welfare.  I shall be indifferent to it.”  It may initially look as though such a principle can 
be consistently willed.  After all, I am not depriving myself of any aid that I could ever 
possibly need (being a member of the current generation).  I am also not depriving 
anyone around of aid.  If future generations could not help or harm us, there could be no 
hope for an inconsistency in adopting a principle of indifference, of renouncing their aid. 
                                                                                                                                            
32Herman, p. 62.   
 
33Again, this is for the sake of simplicity.  It does not appear to me that there is anything in my argument 
that rests on anything that is peculiar to Herman’s reading.   
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 However, there are good reasons to reconsider whether it truly is the case that 
future generations cannot aid us in achieving our ends.34  Consider as an example Jim the 
Researcher.  Jim dedicates his entire life to what he believed was a promising form of 
medical research in which he was able to manipulate the growth of new blood vessels.  
Jim is convinced that a restriction of growth of new blood cells will provide a cost-
effective and life-saving new form of cancer treatment.  Jim’s colleagues are less 
convinced.  His last research grant was denied, and all of his publications on the subject 
have been rejected.  But Jim is determined.  He uses all of his personal funds (mortgages 
the house, sells his cars) and starts up his own research company in order to perfect his 
technique.  Then he dies.  His lab is sold off to pay for his outstanding debts, and his 
papers are auctioned off to a local museum where they are archived.  There they sit until 
one day a group of scientists decide to reevaluate his work.  There are then two things 
that could happen.  Either they could see that Jim was onto something, or they could re-
confirm their suspicion that Jim was just a crazy, deluded old man.  But importantly, 
whichever they do will either help or harm Jim – they will determine whether his life was 
a success or a failure, whether he achieved his end of curing cancer.  As John O’Neill has 
argued, future generations can play an important role in determining whether our projects 
are successes or failures; they can vindicate our work or confirm it to have been a waste 
of our time; whether or not our projects are brought to fruition will often be determined 
by future generations.35   
                                               
 
34For similar arguments of a non-Kantian variety, see John O’Neill’s “Present Harms” (which also includes 
a lovely, detailed example) and Douglas MacLean’s “A Moral Requirement for Energy Policies”. 
35O”Neill, p. 41. 
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 What this also reveals is the way in which we care about the objective realization 
of many of our ends.  Jim probably knew that his work would not make a difference in 
his lifetime, and yet he kept working because he found the end itself to be valuable – a 
cure for cancer.  Many of the ends that rational agents set clearly seem to belong to this 
variety, notably the well-being of our friends and families (even if we are unaware of it). 
We will some of our ends because we find them objectively valuable.  But if the willing 
of an end involves a concern for the realization of that end in the world, then end-setting 
is not a subjectivist matter.  We care about the objective realization of our ends.  Insisting 
that future generations cannot help or harm us relies on a subjectivist, hedonistic account 
of what it means to harm – that harm is reducible to a particular mental state, and because 
mental states stop when we die, there can be no possibility of harm.36  But this fails to 
capture many of the goals and ends of our lives.  It seems that part of what it means to 
will these sorts of ends entails that we care deeply about them being realized even if it 
occurs after our death.  And some of our ends are long-ranging enough where this is a 
real possibility; the success or failure of our projects and ends will then depend on the 
efforts of future generations.  Future generations, then, can also play a pivotal role in 
helping us to achieve our ends. 
 But if future generations can have a role to play in helping us achieve our ends, 
then it does not seem that we can rationally exclude them from our moral considerations, 
unless we are willing and rationally able to give ends that we would wish to be realized 
even after our deaths.  But there are a number of reasons why we could not rationally do 
this.  First, as finite beings, we have little control over when we die.  It will be difficult 
                                               
 
36See O’Neill, p. 45, and MacLean, p. 137. 
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for us to make sure that we do not have any unachieved ends of a personal nature that we 
would not will for future generations, or our more immediate successors to carry out.  
Secondly, according to Kant we also have ends that are demanded by reason – our ends 
that are also duties – our own perfection and the happiness of others.  These are ends that 
are rationally required out of a respect for the humanity in ourselves and others.  Among 
other things, a respect for humanity is a respect for the human ability to set our own ends, 
to be self-determined.37  We must work to develop our talents – to fail to do so would be 
to fail to respect the humanity in our own person.  We must work to promote the 
happiness of others, because a respect for humanity in their person, a humanity that 
makes them capable of setting all sorts of ends – requires me to embrace at least some of 
their ends.38  A respect for humanity in ourselves and others, a respect for our ability to 
set and achieve all sorts of ends, requires us not merely to respect the rights of humanity, 
it does not merely prohibit certain forms of treatment of others, but it also requires us to 
promote the conditions in which ends can be realized.   
 By rejecting a principle of indifference toward future generations, we must then 
be willing to take on a positive duty of aid.  Future generations are part of our community 
of mutual aid– they are necessary to bring to fruition our ends, ends that we either want to 
realize more than we hope to gain by a principle of unconcern for future generations, or 
ends that we simply can not give up as rational agents.   
                                               
37What exactly is required by a respect for humanity, and what exactly is in humanity that is so worthy of 
respect is a highly contentious issue that is well worth side-stepping for the sake of this paper.  For an 
excellent summary of the various interpretations, see Richard Dean’s The Value of Humanity in Kant’s 
Moral Theory, (New York: Oxford University Press, 2006).  All that is required for my purposes is the idea 
that there is something about our ability to choose that it would be irrational for us to give up.    
 
38The Metaphysics of Morals 6: 379-386.   
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 It is beyond the scope of this paper to explore the more specific duties that our 
general obligation to future generations would specify.  To do so would require an 
involved discussion of the scope and latitude of our imperfect duties.  But, it does seem 
that some tentative suggestions are in order.  Because our duties to future generations are 
similar to our obligations of mutual aid, they could be interpreted as an imperfect duty 
that is fairly demanding.  The scope of mutual aid requires that we need a morally 
relevant reason why we may not help.  It seems appropriate to think of our duties to 
future generations on these grounds:  when evaluating two policies, one of which will 
involve appreciably greater welfare for those people who happen to be living than the 
other, then we need a morally relevant reason why we should not choose the first policy – 
it may be necessary that it violate the rights of those currently existing, or infringe on 
their welfare in a similar or worse manner.  Furthermore, because some of our ends 
extend indefinitely, and willing an end entails that we will the conditions that are 
necessary to achieve this end, it appears that many of our duties to future generations 
would involve a concern for the conditions in which our ends, and ends in general, can be 
realized.  Such conditions would include what is generally thought to be owed to future 
generations –the conservation and protection of resources essential to life, a preservation 
of knowledge, art and history.  We would have to protect and promote what are essential 
means for life, and the know-how needed in order to use them.   
  
 We should perhaps not be surprised that a plausible account of the irrationality of 
indifference toward future generations is fairly easy to come by.  As was noted, our 
imperfect duties in Kant are related to bringing about the sort of world that is perfectly 
 23 
suited to our finite rational natures.  This is a world that may never come about, but the 
possibility of which must be postulated in order to provide meaning to many of our 
actions – our actions are contributing to something we cannot help but wish for, and that 
is tied up with both the rationality of our conduct and a loving acceptance of our sensuous 
natures.  It gives our lives meaning, sense and purpose in order to see ourselves as 
contributing to a tangible good even if we may not live to see it.  
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